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Trimble v. Gordon: An Unstated Reversal
of Labine v. Vincent?
On March 15, 1962, Rita Vincent was born in a small parish in
Louisiana. The child was a product of a relationship outside the
bonds of matrimony between Lou Bertha Patterson and Ezra
Vincent. Less than two months after her birth Rita's father and
mother appeared before a notary and executed a form au-
thorized by the Louisiana State Board of Health that publicly
acknowledged that Rita's father was Ezra Vincent.'
Before the child was six years of age, her father died intestate.
Ezra Vincent had lived with Rita's mother until his death in
1968.
Sherman Gordon died intestate six years after Ezra Vincent
in Illinois. Gordon, like Vincent, had lived with a woman with-
out the benefit of a civil ceremony and from this relationship,
Deta Mona Trimble was born. Just after the first of the year in
1973, in conformity with the state laws of Illinois, judgment
was entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, estab-
lishing that Sherman Gordon was the father of Deta Mona
Trimble.2 Along with the judgment was an order for Gordon to
pay fifteen dollars a week for the support of his daughter.
Ezra Vincent and Sherman Gordon were both legally and
morally obligated to support their respective daughters. Both
publicly acknowledged their daughters and resided with the
daughters' mothers until their deaths. However, when Ezra Vin-
cent died, his daughter was unable to claim under him as an heir
to the property he left. After almost five years together as
father-daughter, Rita Vincent received nothing from her
father's estate.' Deta Mona Trimble was much more fortunate.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 203 (West 1967). "The acknowledgment of an illegiti-
mate child shall be made by a public declaration executed before a notary
public, in presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or either of them,
whenever it shall not have been made in the registering of the birth of baptism
of such child."
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 § 56 (West 1976).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919 (West 1967). ". . . [I]n all other cases, they can only
bring an action against their natural father or his heirs for alimony .... The
courts in Labine determined Rita Vincent had sufficient funds from Social
After thewheels of justice had ground to a halt, Deta Trimble
had an opportunity to claim as an heir from her father's estate.
Two intestate deaths six years apart and two major United
States Supreme Court decisions also six years apart, involving
two illegitimate daughters and their qualification to claim inter-
ests in their father's estates, produced two contrasting results.
Labine v. Vincent arose out of a contest between Rita and her
father's brothers and sisters as to who was entitled to the estate
of Ezra Vincent. At the trial level the action was dismissed and
the brothers and sisters were declared Vincent's only heirs at
law. The case was appealed to the Louisiana Intermediate Ap-
pellate Court on the grounds that unequal treatment of a pub-
licly acknolwedged illegitimate child which differs from the
treatment of a legitimate child in a state's intestate succession
statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. The appellate court, in upholding the state's statutory
scheme, rejected the constitutional challenge although it did
acknowledge that it was unfair to punish innocent children for
the faults of their parents. 4 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
denied review. The case was then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court which noted jurisdiction because of the
constitutional questions.5
Deta Mona Trimble's case took a somewhat similar course
through the courts. At the trial court level on the issue of heirs at
law of Sherman Gordon, judgment was entered for Gordon's
father and mother, one brother, two sisters and a half-brother
as Gordon's heirs. The case by-passed the appeals court on a
direct appeal order issued by the highest Illinois court. At that
level the action was joined with two other pending appeals that
presented similar constitutional questions.6 The Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision in In re Estate
of Karas.7 The Illinois court relied explicitly on the authority of
Labine v. Vincent 8 which is based on the state's interest in
encouraging family relationships and the establishment of ac-
Security and Veterans Administration payments for her support. It's interesting
to note how willing the Court is to shift the support of the child to governmental
agencies when the estate of the father was more than ample to provide for her. I
wonder about such a decision if the members of the Court were elected by the
taxpayers.
4. Succession of Ezra Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. 1969).
5. 400 U.S. 817 (1970).
6. In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). In re Estate of
Robert Woods was added also.
7. Id.
8. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
[Vol. 5: 609, 1978] Trimble v. Gordon
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
curate and efficient methods of disposing of property at death.9
The court followed the same reasoning expressed in Labine,
that no "insurmountable barrier"'10 had been erected to prevent
Gordon from leaving his illegitimate daughter a share of his
estate."
At first glance it would seem that the different results reached
in the two cases might reflect the difference in the two statutory
schemes of Louisiana and Illinois. The relevant Louisiana stat-
utes that deal with the problem of illegitimacy and intestate
succession are much more complex than their counterparts in
the Illinois statutes. Section 12 in Chapter 3 of the Illinois Stat-
utes Annotated merely states that an illegitimate child is an heir
only of his mother or any person from whom his mother would
inherit.1 2 Louisiana article 206 under the general area of Family
Relationships states that illegitimate children, though duly ac-
knowledged, (does not make a distinction between mother's or
father's acknowledgment, just acknowledgment by either)
cannot claim the rights of legitimate children. 13 Articles 918 and
919 of the Louisiana Statutes under chapter of irregular succes-
sions, regulate the intestate succession of property to illegiti-
mate children. 14 The illegitimate children of the mother, when
9. Supra note 6.
10. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). This case created the "insurmount-
able barrier" test. Laws classifying illegitimacy could not establish an insur-
mountable barrier against illegitimate children. Under a Louisiana statute, il-
legitimate children could not sue for the wrongful death of their mother. The
Court stated that this created an insurmountable barrier.
11. Supra note 6. The court in the Labine case stated that the father could
have left a will, acknowledged his daughter or married her mother as alterna-
tive ways of providing for the child at his death. The Illinois Supreme Court only
discussed the alternative of leaving a will when it relied on the authority of
Labine.
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3 § 12 (West 1961). "An illegitimate child is heir of its
mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person whom its mother might
have inherited, if living ......
13. LA. CiV. CODE art. 206 (West 1967). "Illegitimate children, though duly
acknowledged, cannot claim the rights of legitimate children." The rights of
natural children are regulated under the title: "Of Successions." The term natu-
ral children means just the biological parent.
14. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 918 and 919 (West 1967). Art. 918: "Natural children
are called to the legal succession of their natural mother, when they have been
duly acknowledged by her, if she has left no lawful children or descendants, to
the exclusion of her father and mother and other ascendants or collaterals of
lawful kindred .... Art. 919: "Natural children are called to the inheritance of
their natural father, who has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no
descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to
the exclusion only of the state."
duly acknowledged, 15 inherit by succession when there are no
other legitimate children or descendants and to the exclusion of
the mother's parents and any other ascendants or collaterals. 16
The father's illegitimate, but duly acknowledged children, 7 in-
herit only to the exclusion of the state. 8 The total and complete
effect of the Louisiana scheme is well-conceived: to encourage
traditional family relationships, adhere to stringent social and
moral restrictions.19
The Illinois statutory scheme, even though not as complex as
Louisiana's, is still concerned with the family relationship. 20 The
two major differences between Illinois and Louisiana intestate
succession statutes regarding illegitimacy are: (1) the illegiti-
mate child can inherit in Louisiana from his father through
intestate succession but only to the exclusion of the state and (2)
the overall emphasis of the Louisiana statutes is to regulate all
areas of family relationships.
It is also noteworthy that both cases were decided with the
same split of the Court, five to four.2' Of the four justices who
dissented in the earlier Labine case, three were still sitting and
joined the majority for the Trimble decision. Conversely, three
justices who supported the majority in Labine sat for the dis-
sent in Trimble.
PRIOR LAW
It is generally agreed that at common law the status of an
illegitimate child was nullius filius for the purpose of inher-
itance.22 This meant that illegitimate children were considered
15. Supra note 1.
16. Supra note 14, Art. 918.
17. Supra note 1.
18. Supra note 14, Art. 919.
19. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 86-89, 119-35, 178-238 (West 1967). The wording and
organization of these statutes is in such detail concerning all rights and duties of
each member of the family that it can only give the impression of having been
deeply rooted in the traditional family unit. For an excellent discussion of the
history and formation of the present Louisiana statutory scheme, see Pascal,
Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts
Prompted by Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1972).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 (West 1961). These statutes are not as detailed and
specific as the above Louisiana statutes.
21. The majority in the Labine case were: Justices Black, Harlan, Burger,
Blackmun, Douglas, White, and Marshall. Six years later in Trimble, Justices
Powell, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and White constituted the majority while
Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart and Blackmun dissented.
22. Pfeiffer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930). In re Garr, 31 Utah 57, 86
P. 757 (1906); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1217 (4th Ed. 1968): nulliusfilius: "the
son of nobody; a bastard. A bastard is considered nullius filius as far. as regards
his rights to inherit."
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to be nobody's child, without kindred and name, being able to
inherit only from their lineal descendants. However, this rule
was eroded in time and most jurisdictions liberalized their
views of illegitimate children by providing limited inheritance
rights through the maternal ancestry.23
The last direct case to face the Supreme Court before Labine
was Levy v. Louisiana24 which established the "insurmountable
barrier"25 test used to review of laws classifying on the basis of
illegitimacy. That case dealt with the denial of standing of il-
legitimates to sue in a wrongful death action of their deceased
mother. The Court decided that this amounted to a social bar-
rier that could not be removed by alternative means. This rea-
soning and test seemed to be reflected in the Labine decision
when the Court relied on the alternatives available to Ezra Vin-
cent to provide for the inheritance of his illegitimate daughter.
It seems that Labine's first impact on the state of the law re-
gulating illegitimacy and inheritance through intestate succes-
sion was one of affirmance of the insurmountable barrier and
the reasonable alternatives tests.28
The first case to follow Labine where the Supreme Court
decided an issue dealing with illegitimacy was Weber v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co.2 The case ruled unconstitutional a
Louisiana workmen's compensation law that allowed unack-
nowledged illegitimate children to claim as "other depen-
dents" 2 only when the maximum amount of recovery had not
been exhausted by awards to legitimate and acknowledged il-
legitimate children as primary dependents. The Court in an
eight to one decision held that Levy applied because the issue
was the status of dependency on the disabled, or in this case, the
decedent, and not whether the child had been acknowledged.
The Court distinguished Labine in that the state's goal of pro-
motion of family relationship was not accomplished by the dis-
23. Id.
24. Supra note 10.
25. Id.
26. 401 U.S. 532, 539.
27. 406 US. 164 (1972).
28. The "other dependents" classification of the law placed illegitimates in
the class with the second priority as to benefits from the workmen's compensa-
tion law. The first priority was given to legitimate children as dependents. The
second class could only receive benefits if the first class had not exhausted the
maximum limit allowed by the law.
crimination between acknowledged and unacknowledged il-
legitimate children.29 The Court reasoned that because the in-
tent of the law was to support and help families, the issue should
be one of determining the degree of dependency of the child
instead of the relationship of the child to the father. It seems
that this case does not lessen the impact of Labine in that the
decedent cannot exercise any other reasonable means or alter-
natives except by acknowledgement which was prohibited by
law,30 that would have provided for support through workmen's
compensation.
A Texas statutory scheme that did not place an obligation on
the father for support of illegitimate children 3' was the issue in
Gomez v. Perez.32 The Supreme Court ruled that discrimination
between illegitimate and legitimate children violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the trial
court judgement was entered that the defendant was the natural
father from whom the plaintiff was seeking support for her
child.
In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,33 the
court ruled that allocation of local benefits which were indis-
pensible to the health and well-being of illegitimate children
could not be made in a manner which discriminates between
legitimate and illegitimate children.34
A Social Security Act classification 35 providing for the eligi-
bility of illegitimate children to obtain social security benefits
through their father was held unconstitutional as a violation of
29. The state objective in Weber was not met by the discrimination between
acknowledged and unacknowledged illegitimate children when the Court found
the issue to be one of dependency on the decedent and not the question of
acknowledgment.
30. LA. CIV, CODE Art. 204 (West 1967) (Referring to Art. 203 (supra note 1)):
"Such acknowledgment shall not be made in favor of children whose parents
were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception; however,
such acknowledgment may be made if the parents should contract a legal
marriage with each other." The father's wife was in a mental neatn institution
at the time of the birth of the illegitimate child, therefore, the father was unable,
because of his present marriage, to contract for marriage at the time of concep-
tion of the illegitimate child and was probably prohibited by law from executing
a valid acknowledgment.
31. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
32 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Art. 4614 repealed by Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 2707
ch. 888 § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1970.
33. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
34. The statute did not specifically discriminate against illegitimate chil-
dren, but was worded to preclude illegitimate children from receiving benefits.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3)(A), 416(h)(2)(B). The statutes regulate the ways in
which an illegitimate can qualify himself to receive benefits under the Social
Security Act.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Jiminez v. Weinberger.36 The Court utilized a more "inten-
sified" 37 scrutiny test in passing on the constitutionality of law
classifying illegitimate children. The case was remanded to al-
low appellants to prove they were eligible "children" 38 under the
Social Security Act.
A similar Social Security Act provision regulating survivor-
ship benefits to illegitimate children was held not unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause in Mathews v. Lucas.39
The Court ruled that a presumption of dependency for legiti-
mate children did not impermissably discriminate against il-
legitimates for purposes of the equal protection clause.40
Finally, the issue raised in Trimble challenged the Illinois
intestate succession statute on the grounds of violation of the
equal protection clause, as had the previous constitutional at-
tacks on laws classifying by legitimacy. The appellants argued
that the statute demanded the strict scrutiny test and offered
three arguments in favor of the stricter test. First, illegitimacy is
a suspect classification that demands more than a mere rational
basis to be constitutional. Second, the Illinois statute discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex.4 1 Third, even if the court rejected the
first two arguments the- Court should apply a farther reach-
ing test than the minimum rational basis required between the
classification and the purpose of the law.
The Court disposed of the case by resolving two of the three
issues raised. The Court reaffirmed the view of Lucas42 that
illegitimacy alone is not a suspect classification. The Court held
that there was not a rational basis between the discrimination
36. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
37. After a discussion by the Court of the rational basis test in its traditional
sense of giving deference to the legislature, the Court could find no basis at all
for the law.
38. The quirk in the law was that illegitimate children born after the disabil-
ity to the social security recipient had a difficult, if not impossible, task of
qualifying under the ways mentioned, supra note 35.
39. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
40. Like Jiminez, the Court did not strike down the statutory qualification
requirements for illegitimates.
41. The sexual discrimination argument was made because of the discrimi-
nation against mother's (female) children versus father's children.
42. Supra note 39.
based on illegitimacy and the recognized state objectives, thus
the sex discrimination issue was never addressed.4 3
ANALYSIS OF TRIMBLE
A major question arising from Trimble is what type of ration-
al basis test did the court use in reaching its decision. It is well
recognized that the traditional rational basis test involves the
court giving great latitude to the state's legislature in requiring
only a rational basis for the statute. It is almost equally as well
recognized that a line of cases has evolved in which the court
has demanded more than a mere rational basis but less than a
compelling state interest as required in the strict scrutiny test.44
These latter cases have involved illegitimacy, 45 sex,46 and clas-
sifications that are based on "personal characteristics that ap-
proach sensitive and fundamental rights. '47 In answering the
question of what type of test the Trimble court applied, it
should be also asked whether with the court's affirmance of the
Labine case, was the rational basis test used in Labine the same
used by the Court in Trimble? Could the apparent difference be
an indication of a new trend evidenced by the different deci-
sions away from the rational basis test completely, or if not, a
qualification and restriction on the application of that test? To
even begin to answer these questions, the Court's reasoning in
Labine must be examined.
It was suggested in Labine that the Louisiana statute did not
create an insurmountable barrier to an illegitimate child taking
property from her natural father at his death. The Court stated
that the father could have left a will, legitimated the child in his
acknowledgment of paternity or married the child's mother. If
the father had done so, the illegitimate child would have been
provided for. This same line of hypothetical reasoning was not
adopted by the Court six years later in Trimble. In that opinion
the Court rejected the hypothetical argument in which the
father could have provided for his daughter as losing sight of
43. 97 S. Ct. 1459 at 1466. The Court concluded that the statute extended
well beyond its asserted purposes and was not carefully tuned to alternative
considerations.
44. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinburger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
45. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Jiminez, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
46. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). See also Lombard, Sex: A Classification in Search of Strict Scrutiny,
21 WAYNE L. REV. 1355 (1973).
47. 97 S. Ct. 1459 at 1463.
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the essential question of the constitutionality of the discrimina-
tion against illegitimate children in a state intestate succession.
Furthermore, the .tate's recognized objectives (accurate and
efficient disposition of the property at death and the promotion
of family relationships) were insufficient to support the dis-
crimination. Thus, the Trimble Court held that the discrimina-
tion was not justified by the state's objectives. The efficient and
accurate disposition of property could be obtained by adequate-
ly worded legislation stating the rights of illegitimate children
whose paternity was properly established through advance
adjudication. 8 The Court even suggests that if the state were
worried about spurious claims from supposed illegitimate chil-
dren on the father's estate, it could set a higher standard of
proof for paternity in cases of illegitimates claiming under their
fathers .4
9
The second recognized state objective was the promotion of
the family unit. Here the Court in Trimble states that not only
was the Court's constitutional analysis incomplete at the Su-
preme Court level in Illinois but that their own analysis in
Labine (upon which the Illinois court relied) was also incom-
plete.50
The Supreme Court stated in Labine:
There is no biological difference between a wife and a concubine ....
The social difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to
the difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. One set
of relationships is socially sanctioned, legally recognized, and gives
rise to various rights and duties. The other set of relationships is
illegal and beyond recognition of the law.5
Granting that there is no biological difference between a wife
and a concubine and that the social relationship is analogous to
that of a legitimate child and illegitimate child, there is however
one great distinction. The situation in which the concubine finds
herself in is partly the result of her own actions, but the situa-
tion in which the illegitimate finds himself is a result of the
chance of birth. The underlying theme of the Court's reasoning
appears to be that because of his mother's actions the illegiti-
mate child is no more worthy of recognition and respect than
she is. This seems to be an anachronism from the dark ages,
48. Id at 1466.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1464.
51. 401 U.S. at 538.
shades of aristocratic monarchy in which a person was judged
more by his family tree than his own personal merits. This
rationale is reflected in Lousiana's statute and legislative his-
tory and even to some extent in the Illinois statute.5 2
Fortunately, the Court in Trimble recognized the weakness of
such reasoning. The Court, without citing cases that had con-
sidered and rejected the argument that a state may attempt to
influence its men and women by imposing sanctions on the
children born of their illegitimate relationships again rejected
the same argument. The Court was clearly referring to its state-
ment in Weber:
... Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burden should
bear some relationship to responsibility or wrong-doing. Obviously,
no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate
child is ineffectual as well as an unjust way of deterring the parent.53
The quotation from Weber seemed more logical to the court in
Trimble than Justice Black's from Labine.
It has been established that the constitutional analysis of the
court in Labine and that of the Illinois Supreme Court in Trim-
ble were incomplete on the state's recognized purpose of pro-
moting family relationships as the justification for the discrimi-
nation in the statute. The traditional rational basis test did not
attempt to look at alternative considerations available to those
drafting statutes for the end purpose of the recognized state
objectives. However, as the Court stated in Trimble, the statutes
must conform to the standard established in Lucas, and the
"statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and
illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternate
considerations., '5 4 The Court in Trimble held that section 12 of
the Illinois intestate succession statutes did not meet the stan-
dards requiring careful tuning to alternative considerations.
Trimble concluded that the statute extended well beyond the
asserted purposes by total statutory disinheritance. The Court
seemed to equate any adjudication as to paternity that enters
judgement for support of the child against the father as being
equally sufficient to establish the illegitimate child's right to
claim a child's share of the father's estate. Therefore, the Court
in Trimble applied the new rational basis test rather than the
traditional test relied on in Labine.
The Court's statement that the constitutional analysis was in-
52. Supra notes 19 & 20.
53. 406 U.S. at 175.
54. 427 U.S. at 513.
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complete on earlier review must mean that when scrutinizing
statutes based on illegitimate classifications the statute must be
attuned to alternative considerations. Without such action by
the court of review, the constitutional analysis is incomplete and
the new rational basis test not used.
It would seem that this new type of test emphasizing finely
tuned alternative considerations in the drafting of a statute is
the same type of reasoning rejected by the Court in Labine. The
court in Labine stated:
It may be possible that some of these choices are more rational than
the choices inherent in Louisiana's categories of illegitimates. But the
power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as
well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Lousiana by a
man dying there is committed by the Constitution of the United States
and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that state. Absent a
specific constitutional guarantee, it is for the legislature, not the life-
tenured judges of this Court, to select among possible laws.55
The court seems to rationalize the different results in Labine
by stating that Labine is an exceptional holding with a limited
precedent.56 This would indicate that even though the present
court feels Labine's constitutional analysis was incomplete, the
case still holds some value as a precedent. Therefore, the Court
had indicated that it would be open to arguments that can be
associated with those given in Labine. The Trimble court reject-
ed the argument that the intent of the legislature drafting the
Illinois statute was only to promote the efficient disposition of
property and strong family relationships. However, the Court
did notice that the Illinois statute was drafted differently from
the Louisiana statute which they upheld. This indicated that the
Court will consider statutes drafted like Louisiana's. The legis-
lative intent argument cannot be completely ruled out as an ad-
ditional argument that could sustain a similar statute. The
55. 401 U.S. at 538.
56. 97 S. Ct. 1464 n. 12. For a discussion of one possible way of distin-
guishing the type of discrimination involved with illegitimacy by a state court
after Labine, but before Trimble, see Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101
(Cuyahoga County 1974), commented on in Janis, Constitutional Law-Equal
Protection-Descent and Distribution-Illegitimate Statute that Prohibits Inher-
itance by Illegitimate Father Denies Equal Protection-Green v. Woodard, 44 U.
CINN. L. REV. 415 (1975), distinguished from Labine on the basis of different
classes of illegitimacy. See also Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inher-
itance and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377 (1975) (suggesting
that Labine would not stop a local inheritance statute from being interpreted
favorably for the illegitimate).
Court stated that the Illinois Supreme Court did not pass on the
issue of legislative intent and concluded this to be significant.5
The Illinois Supreme Court presumably felt the issue was not
open to consideration because of the explicit authority of
Labine. It would be interesting to see how the Court would treat
a similar statute on appeal directly from the state's highest
court with the court upholding the statute as a means of accom-
plishing the legislative intent that family relationships be pro-
moted and that the disposition of property be efficient. The
Court would then have to face the issue of legislative intent
squarely in overruling such a statute.
A further issue which might arise from Trimble concerns
statutes requiring children to support their parents. Before
Trimble, it probably could have been stated generally that when
the laws classifying on the basis of illegitimacy are closely re-
lated with the support of the child the Court was most likely to
review the statute with the new rational basis test and a more
"intensified" scrutiny of the statute.5 8 The decision of Trimble
would seem to deviate from this general statement. The trend
could possibly be to give the more intensified test to all laws
classifying illegitimacy. If this is true how will the Court react to
support statutes with an obligation for children to support their
parents?
The answer to the questions of illegitimacy as classifications
probably lies in determining what type of social condition is
being regulated by the statute and the relationship it has to the
illegitimate child. Is it one of support, 9 government benefits, 60
the seeking of civil action,6 1 or the right to inherit6 2-how does
the action relate to the illegitimate? The Trimble case could
then be argued to be a decision that has expanded the type of
regulation (inheritance rights) which the Court will heavily
scrutinize in order to protect the illegitimate child.
The dissent's opinion continues the cry of some of the mem-
bers of the Court for consistency in the application of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Rehn-
quist expressed feelings that the framers of the Constitution
and the 14th Amendment could not have meant to give the
57. 97 S. Ct. at 1468.
58. Weber involved workmen's compensation benefits; Cahill dealt with
denial of benefits "indispensable" to health and well-being of the child; Jiminez
and Lucas with social security benefits.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
62. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
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power to the Supreme Court to strike down laws such as the
Illinois statute.
The dissenting opinion further stated that certain conduct
requires a lessor or greater degree of protection. The conduct
felt to require a greater degree of protection was free speech,
unreasonable search and seizure and the right to a fair trial.
Furthermore the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should test whether persons similarly situated
should be treated similarly with the crux of the test being
whether persons are similarly situated for the purpose of the
state action at issue. The types of classifications that demand
strict scrutiny are race or national origin and alienage. Illegiti-
macy was held not to deserve the strict scrutiny test or any
special preference at all. Justice Rehnquist shows preference
for a test that should be similar to the one voiced in Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.63 In Arlington, the
Court stated that because of the variety of legislative purposes
the courts should refrain from reviewing the competing merits
of the intent of legislature in passing the law.64 This seems to be
the traditional rational basis test.
The position taken by the dissent is not without merit even
though it would severely limit the type of review the court
should give. The cry for consistency still seems to be valid. Some
consistent level of review should be established with which the
legal community and the legislature can work with confidence.
It should not be a hunt and peck display by the nation's highest
court. Examine the result in Trimble: the Illinois Supreme
Court relied on" the Labine case, which was factually on all
fours with Trimble and, yet nevertheless was reversed.
SUMMARY
The stability of a country is represented by the stability of its
society, and the stability of its society is dependent upon the
stability of the laws regulating its society. Approximately twen-
ty states have similar statutes that become vulnerable to
constitutional attack because of the decision in Trimble.65 This
63. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
64. Id. at 563.
65. ALA. CODE tit. 26; ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 § 141; D.C. CODE § 19-316; GA.
CODE ANN. § 113-904; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 532-37, 577-14; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
391.090 (Baldwin 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 190 § 5 (West 1959); Miss.
country now has a court that is divided on what exactly the
Fourteenth Amendment means and has probably reached the
point of no return in respect to the formation of a new rational
basis test.
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CODE ANN. § 91-1-15; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 447.060, 474.070 (Vernon 1971); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 561:4; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A: § 4-7 (West 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84 § 215 (West 1972); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 20 § 2017; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-8; S.C.
CODE § 21-3-30; TEX. STATS. PROB. § 42 (Vernon 1965); VA. CODE §§ 64.1-6; W. VA.
CODE §§ 42-1-5, 42-1-6; Wyo. STAT. § 2-44; Connecticut case law limits illegitimate
children to inheritance from just their mothers.
